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Abstract
Kidney transplants are sharply overdemanded in
the United States. A recent innovation to address
organ shortages is a kidney exchange, in which
willing but medically incompatible patient-donor
pairs swap donors so that two successful transplants
occur. Proposed rules for matching such pairs in-
clude static fair matching rules, which improve
matching for a particular group, such as highly-
sensitized patients. However, in dynamic environ-
ments, it seems intuitively fair to prioritize time-
critical pairs. We consider the tradeoff between es-
tablished sensitization fairness and time fairness in
dynamic environments. We design two algorithms,
SENS and TIME, and study their patient loss. We
show that the there is a theoretical advantage to pri-
oritizing time-critical patients (around 9.18% trade-
off on U.S. data) rather than sensitized patients.
Our results suggest that time fairness needs to be
considered in kidney exchange. We then propose
a batching algorithm for current branch-and-price
solvers that balances both fairness needs.
1 Introduction
Kidney disease has consistently been a leading health prob-
lem in the United States; in 2016, there were 44,193 nephritis
mortalities, making it the 9th leading cause of death. In the
general American population, poor kidney health is incredi-
bly prevalent; an estimated 31 million people, or 10% of the
adult population, have chronic kidney disease (CKD), which
may progress to end-stage renal disease (ESRD) or high risk
for outright kidney failure.
It is vital that ESRD patients are promptly treated with
either of two options: dialysis or transplantation. A trans-
plant is significantly more affordable ($32,000 followed by
$25,000 annually vs. dialysis’s $89,000 annually) and effec-
tive (80% five-year survival rate vs. dialysis’s 35%) [U.S. Re-
nal Data System et al., 2014]; however, there has long been
a severe—and increasing—organ supply shortage. In 2016,
54,261 patients were added to the kidney transplant waiting
list, but only 19,060 transplants were performed with median
wait times of well over two years [Procurement et al., 2017].
While there is a definite lack of donors, the kidney short-
age is exacerbated by patients who may have willing, but
medically incompatible live donors—who then must then join
a kidney waitlist. To safely transplant, patients and poten-
tial donors must show positive crossmatch (compatibility)
in blood type. However, even if their donor’s blood type
matches, patients may be further limited by their tissue sen-
sitization, or probability of tissue crossmatch failure, as mea-
sured by a Calculated Panel Reactive Antibodies (CPRA)
score between 0 (0% probability of tissue crossmatch fail-
ure) and 100 (100% probability of crossmatch failure). In
our work, we refer to sensitization scores between [0,1], or
the CRPA score divided by 100. Highly sensitized patients
(CPRA score ≥ 80) are at a much higher risk of death, cur-
rently waiting three times longer for transplantation [Dicker-
son et al., 2014].
A promising innovation to address the patient-donor mis-
match problem—and the general kidney shortage—is a kid-
ney exchange. A kidney exchange allows medically incom-
patible patients to swap donors with other such patients, re-
sulting in two successful transplantations where there would
have been none. Swaps can be generalized as k-cycles, where
k patients give their donors to each other, resulting in k trans-
plantations. An altruistic donor, with no attached patient, can
also start a chain, where patients pay forward their donor be-
ginning with the altruistic donor’s recipient. Because no cur-
rency is involved, organ exchanges do not violate the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984 [Abecassis et al., 2000]. Kid-
ney exchanges present an interesting problem, approachable
from both the economics and theoretical computer science
angles: given a set of incompatible patient-donor pairs, how
might we solve for the ”optimal” set of cycles and chains?
Before this NP-hard problem can be approximated, the first
step for the field is to articulate the problem; i.e. define,
justify, and theoretically solve for ”optimality” [Abraham et
al., 2007]. The standard definition is the earliest; it focuses
on maximizing the number of patients matched at the time
the problem is considered [Roth et al., 2004]. This defini-
tion of ”optimality” as maximizing the cardinality of patients
matched is utilitarian, while its simple consideration of only
the present time period is called myopic. Later work proposed
dynamic utilitarian methods, which emphasize maximizing
the number of patients matched over an extended or infinite
time period [Dickerson et al., 2012][Unver, 2010]. Consid-
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ering multiple time periods allows the central clearinghouse
to strategically save valuable pairs for a later time period,
where they might result in more overall matchings than if
matched immediately. Ashlagi and Roth [2011] and Hajaj,
et al. [2015] also consider strategyproof utilitarian methods,
which ensure hospitals have no incentives to misreport their
mismatched pairs to maximize personal gain at the cost of
overall utilitarianism.
Recently, several authors have also considered the question
of fairness. Dickerson [2014] defines a sensitization fairness
as prioritizing highly-sensitized patients, who, by definition,
are harder to match and may remain unmatched while easier-
to-match pairs are cleared. Dickerson quantifies the theoret-
ical loss in matched patient cardinality compared to the my-
opic utilitarian algorithm as 233 using United States averages.
Separately, work by [Kahng, 2016], [Anderson et al., 2014],
and [Akbarpour et al., 2014] raise the question of time fair-
ness, a natural concern in emerging dynamic problem formu-
lations, which minimizes wait time for patients and may pri-
oritize critically ill patients with higher mortality rates due
to limited lifespan. As patients are diagnosed with ESRD at
varying eGFR levels, we consider a pre-dialysis eGFR level
of 5 mL/min/1.73 m2/year as critical. Intuitively, it seems
that strict sensitization fairness may come at the cost of time
fairness, and vice versa. Especially as kidney exchange mod-
els shift from static to dynamic and time fairness becomes
an increasing concern, the kidney exchange clearing problem
faces a major question: how should pairs be prioritized, and
at what cost?
We explore the cost of prioritizing highly-sensitized pa-
tients over time-sensitive patients. Theoretically, we show
that there is an advantage to prioritizing time-critical pa-
tients over highly-sensitized patients on the standard kid-
ney exchange model. We then quantify our results using
United State data, and finally, we propose a mechanism to
consider both highly-sensitized and time-critical patients in
sparse graphs.
2 Model
2.1 Kidney Exchange
We consider the standard discrete-time kidney exchange
model as established in [Dickerson et al., 2014], [Ashlagi and
Roth, 2011], [Roth et al., 2004], and [Unver, 2010] using the
ABO blood model and two levels of sensitization. The kid-
ney exchange pool at time t is a set Vt of patient-donor pairs
v = (p,d). Pairs enter the market at some time t ≥ 0; the
average quantity of incoming pairs per time step is n. Pairs
leave the pool either when matched with another pair w ∈ Vt
or when v perishes. A pair is denoted as critical if its patient
has an eGFR ≤ 5 mL/min/1.73 m2/year. Critical pairs have
a perishing rate of ρC and non-critical pairs have a perishing
rate of ρNC, where ρC  ρNC. A non-critical pair that is not
matched has probability ηC of becoming critical the next time
step.
There are 32 types of pairs, categorized by the CPRA score
ps of p and the blood types X and Y of p and d, respec-
tively. Begin by partitioning Vt by blood type into 16 sub-
sets VX−Y . Next, as we consider only two levels of sensi-
tization, consider a sensitization thershold dividing highly-
and lowly-sensitized patient, σ ∈ [0,1]; in practice, σ = 0.8.
Highly-sensitized pairs have sensitization level γH ; lowly-
sensitized pairs have γL. The average sensitization level
γ¯= µH ·γH +(1−µH) ·γL. Further partition each subset VX−Y
into {V LX−Y ∪V HX−Y}, such that:
• V LX−Y is of patient-donor blood types X − Y and not
highly-sensitized: {v|v ∈VX−Y , ps < η}
• V HX−Y is of patient-donor blood types X −Y and highly-
sensitized: {v|v ∈VX−Y , ps ≥ η}
A future pair incoming at some time τ> t has an arrival prob-
ability µH of being highly-sensitized and arrival probability
1− µH of being not highly-sensitized. The average propor-
tion of the entering pool that is critical is µC. The probability
of an individual (patient or donor) arriving with blood type X
is µX . Therefore, at τ,
E(|V HX−Y |)≤ n ·µX ·µY ·µH (1)
E(|V LX−Y |)≤ n ·µX ·µY · (1−µH) (2)
Vt induces a compatability graph Gt = Vt ,E(Vt), in which
the nodes are pairs, and v forms an edge with another pair w∈
Vt only if the donor of w is compatible with the patient of v. A
cycle c in G represents a kidney exchange where each vertex
in c obtains the kidney of the previous vertex. Cycles may
be of length k. We limit our cycles to k = 3, as Ashlagi and
Roth [2011] prove that this length is sufficient for a perfect
matching. For simplicity, we do not consider altruistic chains.
A matching m is a collection of vertex-disjoint cycles in G.
The set of all legal matchings on G is M.
2.2 Tradeoff Between Two Algorithms
We study the tradeoff between prioritizing sensitization fair-
ness over time fairness through two algorithms: SENS and
TIME. Consider the set of all highly-sensitized pairs Ht ⊆Vt
and the set of all critical pairs Ct ⊆ Vt . SENS maximizes the
highly-sensitized pairs matched, while TIME maximizes the
critical pairs matched. Formally:
SENS(Gt) = arg max
m∈M
|{v ∈ m∧ v ∈ Ht}| (3)
T IME(Gt) = arg max
m∈M
|{v ∈ m∧ v ∈Ct}| (4)
As these algorithms will always match their target pairs
over another similar pair when possible, we argue that SENS
and TIME upper bound the potential losses due to pursuing
each brand of fairness. An algorithm’s loss at t is defined as
the number of agents who perish after the clearinghouse acts
during t. Formally:
Lt(ALG)= ρC|{v /∈mALG∧v∈Ct}|+ρNC|{v /∈mALG∧v /∈Ct}|
(5)
We study the loss, rather than the utility, of algorithms.
We make two arguments for this approach. First, the very
nature of time fairness, concern over critically ill patients with
a higher perishing rate, prioritizes the question of how many
might we lose? rather than how many might we not match?
Second, choosing algorithms that minimize loss, rather than
maximizing utility, may be fairer. Lost pairs are lost forever,
but unmatched, unperished pairs may actually improve their
matchability when new pairs enter the pool in later rounds.
Since these pairs lose much less than pairs who perish during
the time step, we study our algorithms through their losses.
The tradeoff between SENS and TIME is defined similarly
to Dickerson’s price of fairness [2014]:
T RDOFF(SENS,T IME) = lim
τ→∞
Lτ(SENS)−Lτ(T IME)
Lτ(SENS)
(6)
Note that we study this tradeoff in a dynamic environment
(i.e. we consider the tradeoff as t → ∞, rather than just at
t = 0); as of this writing, only [Ashlagi et al., 2013] has also
studied fairness in dynamic matching, and then only sensiti-
zation fairness.
3 Theory
In this section, we upper bound the tradeoff between SENS
and TIME on dense graphs. We show that, with high proba-
bility, the theoretical tradeoff is upper bounded by 2.385.
3.1 Setup
We begin by partitioning Vt into {V O∪VU ∪V S∪V R} based
on the ease of finding another blood-compatible pair. We de-
fine a universal binary relation C over the four blood types.
Blood type X C blood type Y if X can receive a kidney from
donor of blood type Y . We then create four subsets of Vt :
• V O = {VX−Y : X C Y ∧X 6= Y} (i.e. the patient is offer-
ing a donor more valuble than the one they seek. These
pairs may still be in Vt due to tissue incompatability with
probability γ¯)
• VU = {VX−Y : Y CX∧X 6=Y} (i.e. the patient is seeking
a donor more valuble than the one they offer)
• V S = {VX−X} (i.e. the patient and donor have the same
blood type)
• V R = {VX−Y : Y 6 X ∧X 6 Y} (i.e. pairs A-B or B-A)
We make the same assumptions as Ashlagi and Roth [Ash-
lagi and Roth, 2011], which are supported by United States
data (see below).
Assumption 3.1 (Average sensitization of incoming patient)
µH < γ¯ < 12 since, in practice, µH is
1
3 [Center, 2017] and
γH ∈ [0.8,1.0).
Assumption 3.2 (Blood type frequency) µO < 1.5µA [Dick-
erson et al., 2014]
Under these assumptions, Ashlagi and Roth’s Lemma 5.1
proves that, with high probability in a dense graph, there ex-
ists a matching M∗ that matches all of V O, V S, and V R, though
not all of VU [2011]. We use this as the foundation for our
work.
3.2 Loss of SENS
In this section, we solve for the loss of SENS for some time
τ> 0.
Lemma 3.1 (Loss of SENS)
Lτ(SENS)≤ ρC[
τ
∑
k=0
µC ·µHO−AB · (1−ρC)k
+ηC
τ
∑
k=0
[
k
∑
j=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC) j](1−ρC)τ−k]
+ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)k]
for t = 0
We first consider the SENS algorithm’s loss on a newly en-
tered pool at t=0; i.e. there are no pairs in V0 before n pairs
are added to V0.
SENS seeks to match the maximum cardinality of matched
and highly sensitized pairs. By Ashlagi and Roth’s Lemma
5.1, all pairs in V O, V S, and V R are matched; trivially,
this includes highly-sensitized pairs. Therefore, the only
remaining unmatched highly-sensitized pairs are in VU =
{VA−AB,VB−AB,VO−A,VO−B,VO−AB}. We then exhaustively
consider how many pairs in VU remain unmatched, as in
Dickerson’s proof [2014].
As many B-AB pairs as possible have been matched in
2-cycles to AB-B pairs. Note that |V HB−AB| ≤ n · µB · µAB ·
µH , while |VAB−B| ≤ n · µB · µAB · γ¯. Under assumption 3.1,
|VAB−B| ≥ |V HB−AB|. Therefore, all v ∈ V HB−AB are matched.
Similarly, all v ∈ V HA−AB are also matched. Any AB-O pairs
intended to be matched in a 3-cycle with O-A and A-AB can
still be matched in a 2-cycle with e.g. O-A at no loss.
We used 2-cycles to match V HO−A to VA−O and V
H
O−B to
VB−O. Also by assumption 3.1, all of V HO−A and V
H
O−B will
be matched. However, these 2-cycles may exhaust either the
VA−O or VB−O pairs used to match VA−B−VB−A or VB−A−
VA−B in Step 3 of Ashlagi and Roth’s Lemma 5.1, preventing
up to |V rB−AorA−B| lowly-sensitized pairs from being matched.
By Lemma 5.1 of Ashlagi and Roth [2011], this difference is
o(n), smaller than any subgroup and sublinear in n; therefore,
this term is insignificant as n→ ∞.
The only remaining group, VO−AB, cannot be matched
without replacing another pair: swapping out an AB-O, O-
A, A-AB 3-cycle for an AB-O, O-AB 2-cycle results in loss
of one pair, breaking up two AB-B, B-O (or AB-A, A-O) 2-
cycles for an AB-B, B-O, O-AB (AB-A, A-O, O-AB) 3-cycle
also results in loss of one pair. Therefore, the overall number
of unmatched pairs ≤ n ·µO ·µAB ·µH .
Let µHO−AB = n · µO · µAB · µH . Of these lowly-sensitized,
unmatched pairs, µHO−AB · µC are critical, while µHO−AB · (1−
µC) are not. Therefore:
L0(SENS)t=0 ≤ ρC[µC ·µHO−AB]+ρNC[(1−µC) ·µHO−AB] (7)
for t > 0
Next, we consider SENS’s loss at t = 1. There are |V 0O−AB| ≤
µHO−AB lowly-sensitized pairs already in the pool from t = 0.
Figure 1: The matching proposed in Ashlagi and Roth’s Lemma
5.1 is shown as the arrows between pair blood type nodes. Highly-
sensitized pair blood types that we exhaustively consider above are
shown with a gray background. Losses due to SENS’s modifications
have a black background.
The new pairs from t = 1 are then added to the pool. After
the above steps are run again, there are, at most,
unperished, critical︷ ︸︸ ︷
µHO−AB ·µC · (1−ρC)+
non-critical who became critical︷ ︸︸ ︷
ηC · (1−µC) ·µHO−AB︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=0
+µHO−AB ·µC︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
critical pairs. Becoming critical and perishing are consid-
ered separate events, so the non-critical pairs who became
critical are not multiplied by (1− ρNC). There are also, at
most,
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=0
+(1−µC) ·µHO−AB︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
non-critical pairs. Therefore:
L1(SENS)≤ ρC[µHO−AB ·µC ·(1−ρC)+ηC ·(1−µC) ·µHO−AB
+µHO−AB ·µC]+ρNC[(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)
+(1−µC) ·µHO−AB] (8)
And for t = 2, there are
µHO−AB ·µC · (1−ρC)2+ηC ·
non-critical pairs from t=0, now critical at t=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=0
+µHO−AB ·µC · (1−ρC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
+
non-critical pairs from t=1 (including non-critical, untransformed pairs from t=0)
ηC
︷ ︸︸ ︷
[(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)+(1−µC) ·µHO−AB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
+µC ·µHO−AB︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=2
critical pairs and
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=0
+(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
+(1−µC) ·µHO−AB︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=2
non-critical pairs. In general, for t = τ and τ> 0, there are
τ
∑
k=0
µC ·µHO−AB · (1−ρC)k
+ηC
τ
∑
k=0
[
k
∑
j=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC) j](1−ρC)τ−k
critical pairs and
τ
∑
k=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)k
non-critical pairs, making the total loss for τ> 0
Lτ(SENS)≤ ρC[
τ
∑
k=0
µC ·µHO−AB · (1−ρC)k
+ηC
τ
∑
k=0
[
k
∑
j=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC) j](1−ρC)τ−k]
+ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)k] (9)
3.3 Loss of TIME
In this section, we solve for the loss of algorithm TIME for
some time τ> 0.
Lemma 3.2 (Loss of TIME)
Lτ(T IME)≤ ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
µCO−AB · (1−ρNC)k]
for t = 0
We use a parallel method for algorithm TIME as we did for
SENS. In the last step, the overall number of unmatched pairs
≤ µCO−AB, where µCO−AB = n ·µO ·µAB ·µC; all are non-critical
pairs. Therefore, the loss for TIME is:
L0(T IME)≤ ρNC[µCO−AB] (10)
for t > 0
For t > 0, no critical pairs carry over from the previous time
step; therefore, there are no critical pairs. However, there are
τ
∑
k=0
µCO−AB · (1−ρNC)k
non-critical pairs. Therefore, for t = τ:
Lτ(T IME)≤ ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
µCO−AB · (1−ρNC)k] (11)
3.4 Tradeoff between SENS and TIME
We use our above results to calculate the tradeoff defined by
equation (6).
T RDOFF(SENS,T IME) =
lim
τ→∞
ρC[
τ
∑
k=0
µC ·µHO−AB · (1−ρC)k
+ηC
τ
∑
k=0
[
k
∑
j=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC) j](1−ρC)τ−k]
+ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)k]
−ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
µCO−AB · (1−ρNC)k]
ρC[
τ
∑
k=0
µC ·µHO−AB · (1−ρC)k
+ηC
τ
∑
k=0
[
k
∑
j=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC) j](1−ρC)τ−k]
+ρNC[
τ
∑
k=0
(1−µC) ·µHO−AB · (1−ρNC)k]
(12)
In the United States, µO = 0.44, µAB = 0.10, µH = 0.3
[Dickerson et al., 2014], µC = 0.14 (where critical patients
are those who begin treatment with eGFR < 5 mL/min/1.73
m2/year) [U.S. Renal Data System et al., 2016], ρNC = 0.25,
and ηC = 0.09 [Al-Aly et al., 2010]. There is limited data
about the relationship between pre-ESRD eGPR scores and
mortality after dialysis begins; however, based on average
mortality increases of 11% based on a severe eGFR decline
in the patient (< -10 mL/min/1.73 m2/year) by [Sumida et al.,
2016], we set ρC = 0.35. Using these numbers, we estimate
the tradeoff betwen SENS and TIME in the United States.
However, since the double summation in LOSSτ(SENS) is
not computable, we estimate the tradeoff at τ= 10:
T RDOFF(SENS,T IME)≈ 0.010496n
0.114249n
≈ 0.091872
In other words, the long-term difference between priori-
tizing sensitized and prioritizing time-critical patients has an
upper bound of around 9.18% of SENS’s unique loss; theo-
retically, matching sensitized patients over time-critical ones
results in moderate losses. (We note, of course, that this
value depends on the constants defined above, of which ηC
and ρNC are still currently under research.) In real-world,
sparser graphs, the loss is likely to be amplified, as Dick-
erson’s Price of Fairness was amplified dramatically [Dick-
erson et al., 2014]. In sparse graphs, it is much harder to
find a matching that matches all of V O, V S, and V R, so losses
for both functions would likely increase. However, we in-
formally argue that TIME would maintain its advantage over
SENS, as it, by nature, attempts to minimize chances for
losses. But at the very least, we prove that time fairness is
theoretically advantageous to sensitization fairness.
4 An Algorithm for Real-World Graphs
Given our results, we propose an algorithm for sparse graphs
that emphasizes matching critical patients while balancing
both sensitization- and time-based fairness. This algorithm
simply breaks up the traditional one-batch solution into four
separate runs, so it is simply layered on top of current (or fu-
ture) kidney exchange solvers. The technique of layering an
algorithm on top of current solvers has been used by [Dicker-
son et al., 2012], although their algorithm is completely dif-
ferent (a parameter-learning weighting system for dynamic
matching).
Algorithm 4.1 (A batching algorithm for both fairnesses)
1. The solver considers only pairs in Ct and matches them
to each other. Unmatched pairs are passed down to the
pool in Step 2.
2. Leftover pairs from Ct are matched to pairs in Ht . Un-
matched pairs in Ct are passed down to the pool in Step
4; unmatched pairs in Ht are passed down to pairs in
Step 3.
3. Pairs in Ht are matched to other pairs in Ht . Leftover
pairs are passed down to Step 4.
4. All remaining pairs are matched.
In addition to relieving stress on the branch-and-price
solver by addressing smaller groups at a time, this algorithm
also avoids a computationally-heavy weighting function—
valid in the future, but not for immediate implementation.
5 Conclusion
Before kidney exchanges can run, they must decide on a
matching rule. Where Dickerson [2014] showed that utili-
tarian matching rules undermine sensitized patients in static
settings, we theoretically showed that sensitization-based
matching rules result in patient losses in dynamic settings.
We also present a new definition of fairness, lexicographical
time fairness, which maximizes the matching of critically-ill,
time-sensitive pairs, and we propose a batched algorithm to
balance time and sensitization needs. We contribute by be-
ing one of the first to consider dynamics fairness, uniquely
Figure 2: Illustration of Algorithm 4.1
evaluate fairness using losses, and the first to propose a time
fairness.
Our work suggests that time plays a larger role in kid-
ney exchange than currently acknowledged. Minimizing wait
times and quickly clearing critical patients likely requires
more than a modification to current branch-and-price solvers;
they instead require an explicitly dynamic solver. We es-
sentially justify recent attempts to entirely reformulate static
solvers into dynamic ones, especially theoretical work in the
formal Markov Decision Process environment [Akbarpour et
al., 2014] [Anderson et al., 2014]. These solvers naturally
optimize time fairness by weighting matches based on long-
term utility with future-discounting; only sensitization fair-
ness needs to be later imposed.
In the end, it is important to remember that kidney prob-
lems affect over a tenth of the United States population, mak-
ing kidney exchange an important, and so time-pressed, inno-
vation. Yet the care we take to design matching rules is more
than theorizing; they affect the fairness, efficiency, and health
of us all.
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